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CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF 
SPEED 
William E. Scheuerman* 
The fact of change has been so continual and so intense that it 
overwhelms our minds. We are bewildered by the spectacle of 
its rapidity, scope, and intensity .... Industrial habits have 
changed most rapidly; there has followed at considerable dis-
tance, change in political relations; alterations in legal rela-
tions and methods have lagged even more .... This fact de-
fines the primary, though not by any means the ultimate, 
responsibility of a liberalism that intends to be a vital force. 
-John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (1935) 1 
Defenders of constitutionalism would do well to heed 
Dewey's observation that the rapid-fire pace of contemporary 
social and economic activity poses considerable challenges. For 
sure, an impressive body of political and legal thought already 
addresses the nexus between constitutions and social and eco-
nomic change. Both Progressive-era intellectuals and the Legal 
Realists, to some extent inspired by Dewey, harshly criticized 
the U.S. Constitution for its seeming inability to adjust effec-
tively to twentieth-century social and economic conditions.2 
Since the late nineteenth century, advocates of social reform 
have repeatedly attacked Article V, arguing that its burdensome 
amendment procedures undermine possibilities for constitu-
tional adaptation required by the changing realities of social and 
economic life. The left-wing journalist Daniel Lazare's recent 
characterization of the U.S. political system as subject to an 
anachronistic "frozen constitution" fundamentally inimical tore-
form is only the latest salvo in a series of harsh reviews of Article 
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. I am grateful 
to Brian Bix, Jamie Druckman, Dion Farganis, and Tim Johnson for detailed written 
comments on an earlier version of this paper, as well as Mary Dietz, Jim Farr, and 
Gordon Silverstein for words of encouragement. 
I. John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action 57-58 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1935). 
2. John R. Vile, The Constitutional Amending Process in American Political 
Thought 137-56 (Praeger, 1992). 
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V previously proffered by suffragists, supporters of a constitu-
tional ban on child labor, and New Dealers who sought a formal 
amendment codifying the welfare state. 3 For their part, many 
liberals in the legal academy long have touted the merits of an 
elastic "living constitution," arguing that only flexibility in legal 
exegesis can keep the constitution attuned to the challenges of 
social and economic dynamism. They consider the literalist and 
originalist modes of interpretation propounded by conservative 
rivals wrong-headed in part because such views allegedly ob-
scure constitutionalism's temporal presuppositions: Written con-
stitutions are intended to remain a source of binding law for "an 
indefinite but presumably long future," but constitutions can ful-
fill this function only if we interpret their norms flexibly in order 
to allow for adaptability amidst "so continual and so intense" so-
cial change.4 
In light of this rich tradition of intellectual debate, it might 
seem presumptuous to assert that scholars have failed to focus 
sufficiently on the threats generated by social and economic dy-
namism to constitutionalism. Nonetheless, I argue here that con-
temporary debates in social theory provide renewed significance 
to the familiar question of the nexus between social change and 
constitutionalism.5 In 1935, when Dewey referred to the "rapid-
ity, scope, and intensity" of social and economic change, he an-
ticipated a core theme of recent social theory, according to 
which we can only make sense of present-day social and eco-
3. Daniel Lazare, The Frozen Republic: How che Conscicucion Is Paralizing De-
mocracy (Harcourt Brace & Co., 1996); David E. Kyvig, Explicic and Auchencic Aces: 
Amending che U.S. Conscicucion, 1776-1995 at 216-314 (U. of Kansas Press, 1996). 
4. Richard Kay, Conscicucional Chrononomy, 13 Ratio Juris 31,33 (2000). 
5. The concept of constitutionalism is a complex and controversial one. For some 
of the difficulties at hand, sec Larry Alexander, ed., Conscicucionalism: Philosophical 
Foundacions (Cambridge U. Press, 1Y98); James Bryce, Conscicucions (Oxford U. Press, 
1901); Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds. Conscicucionalism and Democracy (Cambridge 
U. Press, 1988); Thomas Grey, Conscicucionalism: An Analycic Framework, in John W. 
Chapman and J. Roland Pennock, eds., Nomos XX: Conscicucionalism 189-209 (New 
York U. Press, 1979). As should become clear below, I take the wriccen character of con-
stitutional government seriously; I also believe there arc good reasons for distinguishing 
between higher (constitutional) and lower (ordinary) legislation, and for conceptualizing 
constitutionalism in liberal democratic terms. But my account is meant to be applicable 
to a relative diversity of constitutional systems and normative interpretations thereof. My 
tendency to rely on U.S. examples is merely an expression of my own limitations, but is 
not intended to suggest the superiority of the U.S. status quo. On the contrary, a central 
theme of this essay is that the U.S. constitutional system is plagued by major ills. A re-
cent study by Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Conscicutional Self-
Governmem (Yale U. Press, 2001 ), also focuses on the temporal contours of modern con-
stitutionalism. However, Rubenfeld's study neglects the problem of social and economic 
acceleration. 
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nomic affairs by focusing on their high-speed character. Ours is 
an epoch in which social and economic processes are undergoing 
a multi-pronged acceleration that raises many difficult questions 
for legal scholarship (I).6 Social and economic acceleration chal-
lenges the noble aspiration to establish fundamental constitu-
tional "rules of the game" capable of serving as an effective 
binding force on legal and political actors for a relatively long 
span of time. Conventional ideas about constitutionalism are 
predicated on achieving a modicum of legal constancy and clar-
ity, but this task becomes increasingly difficult in a social world 
in which "the rapidity, scope, and intensity" of change becomes 
ever more significant (II). 
After showing that the recent turn in social theory to pro-
vide "conceptual attention to the timing and spacing of human 
activities" raises tough questions for constitutionalism, I sketch 
the outlines of an institutionally-minded typology of how consti-
tutional systems adapt, albeit typically "by drift and by tempo-
rary ... improvisations," to social and economic acceleration.7 
Social and economic acceleration sheds fresh light on traditional 
debates about constitutional change. In addition, our high-speed 
social and economic environment privileges problematic modes 
of constitutional adaptation, thereby threatening the worthy 
ideal that fundamental constitutional reform requires substantial 
popular participation and deliberation (III). Finally, I conclude 
with some tentative suggestions for how we might counteract the 
alliance between speed and relatively undemocratic mechanisms 
of constitutional change. In order to do so, however, we will 
need to rethink temporal assumptions located at the very heart 
of modern liberal democracy (IV). 
I. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ACCELERATION 
Although political and legal scholars have been reluctant to 
pick up the baton, social theorists have been busily developing a 
perceptive analysis of why the high speed temporal horizons of 
social and economic activity are pivotal for understanding our 
contemporary situation. In a wide-ranging debate that has en-
6. This formulation is indebted to Henry Adams, who nearly a century ago diag-
nosed "a law of social acceleration" in order to make sense of the accelerated tempo of 
contemporary life. Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams 489-98 (Houghton 
Mifllin, 1918). 
7. The first quote is from Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence 12 (U. 
of Cal., 1987); the second is from Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action 57 (cited in note 
I). 
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gaged writers as diverse as Zygmunt Bauman, Anthony Giddens, 
David Harvey, Reinhart Koselleck, and Paul Virilio, a consensus 
appears to be emerging that ours is a world in which social and 
economic processes operate at an ever faster speed, and the 
tempo of even relatively significant social and economic change 
takes an increasingly rapid pace. 8 To be sure, distinct theoretical 
accounts of the institutional roots of the acceleration of social 
and economic life, not surprisingly, differ substantially. For ex-
ample, whereas Giddens and Koselleck have identified a variety 
of institutional and conjectural sources for the growing impor-
tance of speed in social and economic affairs, others (most 
prominently, David Harvey) have tried to locate its origins 
chiefly in modern capitalism. For the Marxist Harvey, capitalism 
represents 
a revolutionary mode of production, always searching out new 
organizational forms, new technologies, new lifestyles, new 
modalities of production and exploitation and, therefore, new 
objective social definitions of time and space .... The turn-
pikes and canals, the railways, steamships and telegraph, the 
radio and automobile, containerization, jet cargo transport, 
television and telecommunications, have altered time and 
space relations and forced new material practices .... The ca-
pacity to measure and divide time has been [constantly] revo-
lutionized, first through the production and diffusion of in-
creasingly accurate time pieces and subsequently through 
8. Zygmunt Bauman. Globalization: The Human Consequences 6-26 (Polity, 
1998); Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence 173-74 (cited in note 7); David Harvey, 
The Condition of Postmodernity 201-326 (Blackwell, 1989); Reinhart Koselleck, 
7eitschichten 150-202 (Suhrkamp, 2000); Paul Virilio, Speed & Politics (Semiotcxt, 1986). 
For a useful survey of the debate in social theory, sec John Urry, The Sociology of Space 
and Time, in Bryan S. Turner, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory 369-95 
(Blackwell, 1996). For two recent attempts to grapple expressly with social and economic 
acceleration from the standpoint of legal analysis, sec William E. Scheuerman, Reflexive 
Law and the Challenges of Globalization, 9 J. Pol. Phil. 81, 81-102 (2<Xll); William 
Scheuerman, Global Law in our High-Speed Economy, in Richard Appelbaum, Wm. 
Fclstiner, and Volkmar Gessner, eds., Rules and Networks: The Legal Cullllre of Global 
Business Transactions I 03-21 (Hart, 2(Xll ). At least implicitly, the challenges posed by 
social and economic acceleration arc addressed as well in the theoretical literature on 
statutory lawmaking, where scholars have linked the proliferation of statutes in the twen-
tieth century (as well as the resulting dilemma of statutory obsolescence) to it. For exam-
ple, Guido Calabresi notes that "the speed with which perceived economic crises have 
followed upon economic crises has brought forth legislative responses ... [S]tarting with 
the Progressive Era but with increasing rapidity since the New Deal, we have become a 
nation governed by written laws" (A Common Law for Statutes 5 (Harvard U. Press, 
1982)). If I am not mistaken, many (conceptually underdeveloped) references to what I 
am describing here as social and economic acceleration can be found in legal scholarship. 
For an excellent general discussion of the nexus between social change and the law, sec 
Alan Watson, Society and Legal Change (Scottish Academic Press, 1977). 
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close attention to the speed and coordinating mechanisms of 
production (automation, robotization) and the speed of 
movement of goods, people, information, messages, and the 
like.9 
Nonetheless, even those theorists who dispute Harvey's 
Marxist account of the origins of social and economic accelera-
tion generally accept his observation that "the history of capital-
ism has been characterized by a speed-up in the pace of life." 10 
Modern capitalism's structurally-rooted drive to reduce turnover 
time and accelerate the course of economic life for the sake of 
improving profitability undoubtedly constitutes a key feature of 
modern economic life; a number of studies-Marxist and other-
wise-confirm the existence of an intimate relationship between 
capitalism and social and economic acceleration. Making effec-
tive use of ever more rapid forms of production and consump-
tion is a proven strategy for business people to maintain profit-
ability and defeat competitors; and capitalism's built-in tendencX 
to speed up economic processes manifests itself in myriad ways. 1 
The unanswered question in the social theory debate concerns 
the precise status of capitalism as a driving force behind social 
and economic acceleration, as well as its place as a causal factor 
among other institutional facets of modernity that constitute 
plausible sources of our high-speed social and economic world. 
Yet no serious social analyst questions the view that modern 
capitalism plays a significant role in generating pivotal facets of 
the "so continual and so intense" change described by Dewey. 
The social theory discussion also continues to focus on ques-
tions of historical periodization. Most agree that the ascent of 
industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century unleashed a par-
ticularly intense period of social and economic acceleration, 
though some have complicated this widely-endorsed account by 
linking social and economic acceleration to features of the mod-
ern world that clearly predate industrial capitalism. 12 But the 
9. David Harvey, Justice, Nature & the Geography of Difference 240-41 (Blackwell, 
1996). 
10. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity 240 (cited in note 8). 
II. On the centrality of speed to contemporary economic life, sec James R. Bcni-
gcr, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information 
Society (Harvard U. Press, 1986). 
12. E.P. Thompson, Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism, 38 Past and 
Present 56, 56-97 (1967). Koselleck underscores key facets of early modern history, in-
cluding innovations in transportation and communications inspired by mercantilism. 
Kosellcck, Zeitschichten at 157-58 (cited in note 8). In some contrast to both Thompson 
and Koselleck, the cultural historian Stephen Kern places special emphasis on techno-
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dominant view seems to be that we have experienced a relentless 
speed-up of key social and economic processes for well over 150 
years now, resulting most immediately from a series of economi-
cally-generated technological innovations (including the rail-
roads, telegraphs, airplanes, and computers) that have worked 
continuously to alter the temporal contours of social and eco-
nomic life. Some writers have elaborated on this periodization to 
claim that recent decades have exhibited a further intensification 
of this long-term trend, as evinced by growing reliance on infor-
mation and communication technologies that provide economic 
actors with dramatically improved opportunities to make use of 
simultaneity and instantaneousness. In this vein, Harvey has 
tried to demonstrate that economic crises are intimately linked 
to relatively intense bouts of social and economic acceleration. 
The worldwide economic downturn of the 1970s paved the way 
for a reorganization of capitalism in which fresh possibilities for 
the successful exploitation of information, communication, and 
transportation technologies came to play a crucial role in eco-
nomic life. Improved rates of commercial and organizational in-
novation, directly linked to novel technologies (for example, 
high-speed computers), constitute core features of a "post-
Fordist" economy that has emerged in the last two decades. For 
Harvey, post-Fordism is driven by high-speed technologies that 
place a "premium on 'smart' and innovative entrepreneurship, 
aided and abetted by all the accouterments of swift, decisive, and 
well-informed decision making." 13 Post-Fordism means that the 
pace of both everyday economic life and relatively significant 
economic innovations is dramatically heightened vis-a-vis earlier 
forms of capitalism. According to this account, a privileged 
status for speed makes up a permanent attribute of capitalism, 
yet acceleration has taken an especially intense form since the 
1970s. 
This is not the appropriate place for a full-fledged critical 
summary of the ongoing social theory debate. For our purposes 
here, it suffices to note that participants in the debate are de-
scribing a collection of phenomena that can be fruitfully grouped 
into three categories. Although the empirical borders between 
them are typically blurred, and notwithstanding the fact that all 
three "ideal-types" of social and economic acceleration are caus-
logical innovations that took place at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth centuries. Stephen Kern, The Culture of Space and Time, 1880-1918 (Harvard 
U. Press, 1983). 
13. Harvey, The Conditwn of Postmodernity at 157 (cited in note 8). 
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ally interrelated as well (and thus can be plausibly interpreted as 
constituting different elements of a single social trend), concep-
tual clarity demands that we try to distinguish among them. 14 
First, we find evidence for an intense process of technologi-
cal acceleration, according to which key technical processes (par-
ticularly in communication, transportation, and production at 
large) now take place at a vastly faster pace than in earlier his-
torical periods. Communication transpires between distant geo-
graphical points at an unprecedented rate, travel times have 
been dramatically cut, and the time necessary for the production 
of even relatively complex commodities undergoes constant re-
duction. Many recent innovations in information technology (for 
example, the Internet) constitute obvious examples of this facet 
of social and economic speed. Under this rubric we can include 
the heightened pace of technological innovation, as the half-life 
of many new forms of technology undergoes rapid decline. As 
the social philosopher Hans Jonas noted over twenty-five years 
ago, technological development in modern times quickly came to 
embody "a principle of innovation in itself which made its con-
stant further occurrence mandatory." 15 This type of acceleration 
can be measured and quantified with relative ease, and its exis-
tence has been documented by many empirical studies. 16 
Second, the pace of significant social change or transforma-
tion exhibits evidence of acceleration as well. Relatively far-
reaching shifts in economic and social life now take place at a 
rapid pace. Forms of economic organization and occupational 
patterns, for example, change intra-generationally rather than 
over the course of whole generations. One familiar result of this 
alteration in the temporal horizons of social life is that our con-
temporaries may change jobs many times during the life-course, 
whereas our early modern historical predecessors often were 
destined to follow occupations identical to those of their parents 
and even grandparents. And even those of us who do not shift 
jobs are likely to find ourselves in workplace settings where con-
stant organizational restructuring or "rationalization" constitutes 
the norm and not the exception. Technological changes can help 
14. The tripartite conceptualization that follows is taken directly from Hartmut 
Rosa, Temporalstrukwren in der Spaetmoderne: Vom Wunsch nach Beschleunigung und 
der Sehnsucht nach Langsamkeit, Handlung, Kulwr, 10:3 Interpretation (2001 ). I am in-
debted to Rosa's concise discussion of the ongoing debate about the social phenomenon 
of speed; his conceptual clarity is something of an exception in the literature. 
15. Hans Jonas, Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man 51 
(Prentice-Hall, 1974 ). 
16. For a superb survey, sec Rosa, 10:3 Interpretation (cited in note 14). 
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produce relatively dramatic changes in economic and social or-
ganization in a short span of time; within a mere two decades, 
new informational technologies have generated far-reaching 
shifts in many arenas of contemporary economic production and 
consumption. 17 The example of computerization also reminds us 
that the process of social change or transformation tends to be 
related to technological acceleration. As the pace of technologi-
cal innovation increases, the rate of major social and economic 
change tends to grow as well, as new forms of technology often-
times, though by no means necessarily, encourage experimenta-
tion with novel forms of social and economic organization. 
Maybe this is why Dewey could make such an easy transition 
from describing the "rapidity, scope, and intensity" of social 
change in general to discussing changes in "industrial habits;" 
perhaps he understood how the relentless revolutionizing of in-
dustrial technologies is often tied to the pace of significant social 
and economic change. 
Finally, the social and economic acceleration of contempo-
rary society includes the heightened tempo of everyday life, ac-
cording to which substantial empirical evidence points to an ob-
jectively-measurable intensification of activities that we 
nowadays engage in during a given unit of time. We eat, walk, 
and talk (or at least communicate) faster than most of our 
predecessors; we also manage to pull this off even though we 
typically sleep less than they did. When Dewey in The Public 
and Its Problems alluded to contemporary society's "mania for 
motion and speed," it was most likely this facet of our high-
speed social and economic world that he had in mind. 18 We 
should probably see this final element of acceleration as most di-
rectly linked to technological acceleration, which constitutes the 
immediate fount for the ever faster pace of everyday life. How-
ever, the relative rapidity with which broader social and eco-
nomic patterns of social life now undergo change may also be 
tied to it. In recent years, this third face of speed has attracted 
the attention of a number of popular authors, who worry that the 
imperatives of an accelerated everyday existence threaten to 
overwhelm human capacities for absorbing information and co-
ordinating our lives in a meaningful and coherent manner. 19 
17. Sec Manuel Castclls, The Rise of Network Society (Blackwell, 1996). Sec also 
Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: Personal Consequences of Work in the New 
Capitalism (W.W. Norton & Co., 1998). 
18. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 140-41 (Ohio St. U. Press, 1972). 
19. Sec, e.g., Jeremy Rifkin, Time Wars: The Primary Conflict in Human History 
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II. THE DILEMMA OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
OBSOLESCENCE 
How then does social and economic acceleration impact on 
constitutionalism? Written constitutions represent exacting 
forms of prospective lawmaking, according to which constitution-
makers are asked to foresee future social and economic trends in 
order to funnel the operations of state power as effectively as 
possible. Of course, ordinary legislators are also asked to predict 
social patterns. Distinctive about written constitutions is that 
their architects typically aspire to do so for "an indefinite but 
presumably long future," however. 20 Statutes may require rela-
tively frequent alteration or fall into disuse, as evinced by the 
growing reliance on sunset laws and other devices that implicitly 
concede their limited half-life.21 But constitutional lawmakers 
traditionally are expected to achieve stable "rules of the game" 
well-suited to myriad future settings. John Locke, one of the in-
tellectual forces behind modern liberal constitutionalism, went 
so far as to argue that the "fundamental Constitutions of Caro-
lina" should "remain the sacred and unalterable form and rule of 
government of Carolina for ever," and anyone who peruses 
Locke's "fundamental Constitutions" will search in vain for 
amendment procedures.22 
Later generations modified Locke's extreme notion of an 
unalterable constitution and also challenged his apparent prefer-
ence for a detailed, code-like constitutional document.23 At least 
since 1789, many written constitutions have contained relatively 
abstract language ("due process," for example, or "cruel and un-
usual punishment"), and this innovation has served as a usetul 
mechanism for constitutional architects struggling to achieve a 
successful legally-binding set of norms able to guide future gen-
erations. In the U.S. case, as in many others, "[t]he very lan-
guage of the Constitution suggests that the Framers ... recog-
nized that the Constitution is . . . a majestic charter for 
government, intended to govern for ages to come and to apply to 
both unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances."24 Nonethe-
less, constitutional lawmakers are still expected to possess im-
(Henry Holt, 1987). 
20. Kay, 13 Ratio Juris at33 (cited in note 4). 
21. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes at59-65 (cited in note 8). 
22. John Locke, Fundamental Constitutions for Carolina, in David Wootton, ed., 
Political Writings of John Locke 232 (Mentor, 1993). 
23. Locke's Fundamental Constitlllions for Carolina is lengthy and detailed. 
24. Stephen Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution 18 (Cato Institute, 1986). 
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pressive powers of foresight. Even the most elastic constitutional 
language is supposed to help guide and bind the activities of sub-
sequent political and legal actors, though the task at hand then 
inevitably takes on additional difficulty. 
Social and economic acceleration conflicts with the tradi-
tional expectation that constitutional lawmakers can be expected 
to predict future trends with some measure of competence. The 
foresight of even the most adept constitutional architect suffers 
in the context of an environment subject to the dictates of speed, 
as the scope of "both unforeseen and unforeseeable circum-
stances" expands dramatically. The half-life of every original 
constitutional agreement is subject to decay in a social and eco-
nomic environment where "so continual and so intense" change 
becomes pervasive. Rapid changes in the social and economic 
circumstances inevitably presupposed by even the most far-
sighted constitutional lawmakers exacerbate the hardships of 
their already difficult tasks. Not even abstract language appro-
priate to its status as a "majestic charter" can circumvent the ne-
cessity of fundamentally updating the constitution in order to ad-
just to social and economic change. As the legal scholar Richard 
Kay rightly notes, "lh]uman history tells us that sooner or later 
every constitution will begin to chafe," and fundamental depar-
tures from an original constitutional agreement inevitably oc-
cur.25 At some juncture, an unmistakable "misalignment be-
tween the constitution and the social and political realities which 
any system of government must take into account" appears; even 
the most pliable constitutional language will need to take on 
novel and unexpected meanings in order to allow for fundamen-
tal ruptures with the constitutional status quo. 26 Social and eco-
nomic acceleration provides the dilemma of constitutional obso-
lescence with special significance. Recall from our discussion 
above that core facets of social and economic acceleration in-
clude the intensification of technological innovation, as well as 
the closely-related process whereby broader patterns of social 
and economic life (occupational patterns, for example, or work-
place organization) now undergo relatively rapid transforma-
tions. Any constitutional system that intends to employ state au-
thority effectively for the sake of grappling with social and 
economic life faces the problem that constitutional lawmakers, 
to a decreasing degree, can realistically succeed in anticipating 
25. Kay, 13 Ratio Juris at 41 (cited in note 4). 
26. Id. 
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the vast unprecedented changes likely to confront future genera-
tions. In relatively static social and economic settings, the specter 
of constitutional obsolescence typically remained distant; per-
haps this is why Enlightenment political and legal thinkers like 
Locke tended to conceive of written constitutions as fundamen-
tally timeless documents, unlikely to require amendment or al-
teration. Like so many other features of our high-speed world, 
however, constitutions risk becoming "out of date" at an ever 
faster rate. No constitution can remain unchanged for long in a 
world where "[a]ll fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of 
ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, 
all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. 
All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned .... "17 
If the diagnosis described in the first part of this essay is cor-
rect, social and economic acceleration also includes the height-
ened frequency of relatively substantial forms of social and eco-
nomic change: We now find ourselves in a social and economic 
world where far-reaching transformations occur at a rapid-fire 
pace. Thus, the enigma at hand is not merely that we require 
constitutional systems to provide a modicum of flexibility so that 
future generations can tinker with their basic structure in order 
to adapt to minimal forms of social change. Instead, constitu-
tions must accommodate frequent and relatively far-reaching so-
cial and economic transformations. Yet fundamental social 
changes are likely to require no less frequent shifts in many ar-
eas of constitutional practice. Just as alterations in the assump-
tions about factual social and economic circumstances underly-
ing any given statute threaten to render it obsolescent,28 so too 
does the dramatically heightened pace of change in core features 
of social and economic life suggest an increased possibility of 
constitutional obsolescence. Every constitutional system is inti-
mately intermeshed with the course of social and economic life, 
and the acceleration of the latter requires adaptation by the for-
mer. As Martin J. Sklar points out, law "is not some 'reflection' 
of, or 'superstructure' hovering above, capitalist property and 
market relations; it is an essential mode of existence ... of those 
relations. When those relations are undergoing substantial 
change, so will the law .... "29 As the pace of social and economic 
27. Friedrich Engels to Karl Marx, ManifesiO of the Communist Party, in Robert C. 
Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader469 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1972). 
28. Cass R. Sunstcin, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulawry State 
174-75 (Harvard U. Press, 1990). 
29. Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-
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activity accelerates, so too does the tempo of legal change. Thus, 
the traditional question of constitutional change necessarily takes 
on greater significance than traditional liberal democratic theory 
anticipated. Social and economic acceleration implies the neces-
sity of a relatively dynamic mode of constitutionalism able to 
adapt to "so continual and so intense" social and economic 
change.30 
In the following section, I outline various paths by which 
constitutional systems struggle to deal with the difficulty of ad-
justing to a high-speed world. Before doing so, we need to be 
clear about the fundamental tensions at hand. Constitutional 
lawmakers are supposed to achieve a relatively coherent docu-
ment able to provide a basis for some, however minimal, meas-
ures of constancy and clarity in the law. For the moment, we can 
bracket the difficult questions of how much constancy or clarity 
is required, the appropriate legal character that they should take, 
as well as their substantive aims and goals. Nonetheless, the very 
idea of a written constitution is predicated on the idea that its 
norms should bind and thereby coordinate social and political 
actors with some degree of constancy if they are to serve as a 
meaningful source for a standing body of jurisprudence con-
cerned with the fundamental "rules of the game." Acknowledg-
ing this point hardl~ requires fidelity to an overly cramped brand 
of legal formalism. 1 Written constitutions are also conceived as 
cogent public statements providing "fair warning" and orienta-
tion to political and legal actors about the basics of political life. 
Although himself an admirer of the "unwritten" British constitu-
tion, even James Bryce conceded that written constitutions were 
1916 at 89 (Cambridge U. Press, 1988). Historical support for this general claim is amply 
provided by Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History (Oxford U. 
Press, 1989) and Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (Simon & Schus-
ter, 2nd. ed.,1985). 
30. This conclusion overlaps with James Tully's call for a dynamic mode of constitu-
tionalism, though I worry about preserving traditional liberal-democratic legal virtues to 
a greater extent than Tully. See James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an 
Age of Diversity (Cambridge U. Press, 1995). 
31. Dewey acknowledged this point, when he referred to the "undoubted need for 
the maximum possibility of stability and regularity of expectation" in the law (Logical 
Method and Law (1924), in Wiliam W. Fisher, et al., eds., American Legal Realism 191 
(Oxford U. Press, 1993)). For a balanced discussion of the merits (and also limits) of con-
stancy and clarity in the law, see Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 63-65, 79-81 (Yale 
U. Press, 1964). Only extreme views of legal indeterminacy are inconsistent with my at-
tempt to take the notion of a written constitution, as well as the traditional legal virtues 
of constancy and clarity, seriously. For a critique of such views, sec Lawrence B. Solum, 
On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462, 462-503 
(1987). 
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better attuned to the democratic temper of contemporary life: 
"the democratic man ... is pleased to read and know his Consti-
tution for himself. The more plain and straightforward it is the 
better. ... "32 
Without presupposing some version of these conventional 
ideas, it becomes unclear why we need written constitutions in 
the first place. Alas, contemporary conditions require constitu-
tions exhibiting enormous flexibility; they now must leave room 
for a vast and constantly expanding range of novel social and 
economic experiences, many of which are likely to prove mo-
mentous. Although social and economic acceleration thus calls 
for heightened constitutional adaptability, it is by no means self-
evident how we can simultaneously achieve a sufficient dose of 
constancy and clarity in constitutional law. A permanently alter-
ing, highly adaptable constitutional system risks opening the 
door to legal inconstancy and opaqueness. Two rejoinders come 
immediately to mind: First, it might seem as though the specter 
of constitutional obsolescence should only concern systems dedi-
cated to the pursuit of expansive forms of state activity in the 
economy. Constitutions based on "free market" or laissez-faire 
ideals might be relatively immune to constitutional obsolescence 
to the extent that they are less committed to regulating fast-
paced forms of social and economic activity, and thus would be 
less subject, for example, to the impermanence of our high-speed 
capitalist economy. Their half-life would remain relatively sub-
stantial. This argument gains some initial empirical support from 
the fact that constitutional systems expressly supportive of far-
reaching state intervention in the economy are precisely those 
where the problem of obsolescent norms and clauses has long 
been most intensely discussed. For example, U.S. state constitu-
tions provided a legal framework for active intervention rela-
tively early on (that is, by the mid-nineteenth century). Yet an 
impressive body of scholarship suggests that the easy amendabil-
ity of state constitutions burdened them with detailed norms 
concerning state economic intervention, many of which (for ex-
ample, specific provisions concerning railroads and the nitty-
gritty of commerce and trade) soon were out of date.33 Nonethe-
32. Bryce, Constitutions at80 (cited in note 5). 
33. For some of the details, sec Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American 
State Constitutions, 12 Publius 57, 57-98 (1982); see also John Dinan, 'The Earth Belongs 
Always to the Living Generation': The Development of State Constitutional Amendment 
and Revision Procedures, 62 Rev. of Pol. 645, 645-74 (2000); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a 
Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in Sanford Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfec-
tion: The Theory and Practice of Constitwional Amendment 237-74 (Princeton U. Press, 
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less, this rejoinder is unconvincing. Constitutional systems com-
mitted to free market ideals also require adaptation to the ever-
changing contours of social and economic change. Governments 
committed to free market policies engage in significant forms of 
state activity in economic and social affairs, as demonstrated by 
the examples of Thatcher's Great Britain and Pinochet's Chile. 
Even a diehard libertarian judge who pursues free market inter-
pretations of a specific constitutional clause (for example, due 
process) will find herself forced to adapt the clause to social and 
economic change, and she is likely to engage in a series of crea-
tive reinterpretations in order to assure its relevance to the 
breakneck pace of social and economic life. Laissez-faire consti-
tutional systems operate within, and thus must react to, the chal-
lenges of social and economic acceleration, no less than constitu-
tional systems committed to the welfare and regulatory states. 34 
Second, perhaps we should see constitutions as expressive 
of a broadly-defined set of abstract moral principles, along the 
lines proposed by Ronald Dworkin and others who have taken 
seriously the fact that written constitutions often consist of open-
ended, moralistic clauses strikingly different from the code-like 
general rules favored by defenders of a traditional model of le-
gality.35 From this perspective, founding fathers (and mothers) 
simply do not intend their offspring to be interpreted in the same 
way as conventional legal rules or statutes. The argument pre-
sented above fails to do justice to the special features of constitu-
tional law. Constitutions should be read as elastic "living" docu-
ments, offering statements of abstract principle that should 
prove relatively immune to changing social and economic condi-
tions. For sure, the ban on "cruel and unusual punishment" may 
imply a different set of concrete legal answers in 2089 than 1789, 
yet at the level of abstract principle, "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" possesses a sufficient degree of moral and legal coherence 
and stability according to which constitutions can maintain the 
requisite measures of constancy and clarity over time. From this 
perspective, the dilemma of social and economic acceleration 
turns out to be a pseudo-problem since constitutions consist of 
1995). 
34. This rejoinder is inspired by the provocative reflections of Stephen Griffin, who 
attributes many of the problematic facets of recent U.S. constitutional development to 
the emergence of the interventionist and welfare states. Stephen M. Griffin, American 
Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics (Princeton U. Press, 1996). 
35. For Dworkin's distinction between rules and principles, see his Taking Rights 
Seriously (Harvard U. Press, 1977). 
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abstract principles able to guarantee their identity and legally 
binding force for "an indefinite but presumably long future." 
Even if we concede the controversial view that we should 
read constitutions as embodying abstract moral principles, how-
ever, the phenomenon of temporal acceleration can hardly be 
disposed of so quickly. At the very least, social and economic ac-
celeration implies that interpretations of abstract constitutional 
principles will be forced to change at a no less high speed rate 
than social and economic life itself. The intensified rate of tech-
nological change, for example, points to the likelihood of regu-
larly reinterpreting what "cruel and unusual punishment" means 
in policy and legal terms. In a similar vein, the legal implications 
of a constitutional "right to privacy" will probably have to be re-
vised in the face of permanent innovation in information tech-
nology. From the bird's eye view of the legal or moral philoso-
pher, "cruel and unusual punishment" or the "right to privacy" 
may seem to embody relatively constant principles; from the 
perspective of the legal or political actor "on the ground," the 
necessity of constantly reinterpreting them represents the more 
noteworthy facet of the enigma at hand. Social and economic ac-
celeration seems to require a speed-up of the process by which 
constitutional norms undergo reinterpretation probably no less 
intense than the general acceleration in social and economic af-
fairs at large. 
At some point constitutional interpretation shades off into 
fundamental constitutional alteration. Even the most abstract 
constitutional principle forecloses some set of imaginable inter-
pretations, and one hardly must endorse an unduly narrow 
model of legal interpretation in order to recognize the virtue of 
maintaining a distinction between the interpretation of a preex-
isting constitutional principle and the invention or creation of a 
new one. Moreover, we can readily concede that the line be-
tween constitutional interpretation and alteration is hard to draw 
in legal praxis, while maintaining that there are good normative 
and institutional reasons for preserving it. We can also admit 
that there are legitimate differences of opinion about the best 
theoretical account of the distinction between interpretation and 
alteration. Nonetheless, formal constitutional amendment pro-
cedures presuppose the possibility of drawing a distinction be-
tween constitutional interpretation and modification. Stripped of 
this distinction, the constitutional commitment to formal 
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amendment- a core feature of most constitutional systems-
makes no sense.36 
As noted above, social and economic acceleration heightens 
the need for relatively frequent fundamental constitutional 
change. The breakneck pace of major social and economic trans-
formation means that the imperatives of constitutional change 
increasingly tend to explode the confines of legal interpretation. 
Abstract constitutional principles will have to undergo relatively 
frequent fundamental alteration in order to adapt effectively. 
Judicial actors who adjust constitutional norms to novel social 
conditions may claim that their decisions represent examples of 
"mere" legal interpretation. A closer examination, however, is 
likely to reveal that their rulings often entail fundamental consti-
tutional alteration. 
This is no mere thought-experiment. It is now something of 
a cliche among scholars that constitutional courts periodically 
engage in constitutional lawmaking nearly as ambitious as the 
original act of constitutional founding. Under the auspices of in-
terpreting Articles Four and Five, many dramatic twists and 
turns have occurred in the fundamental understanding of crimi-
nal procedure, in part as responses to rapidly changing social 
conditions. The open-ended "underlying focus of the law" in this 
arena, namely "the idea that the Constitution places great value 
on one's ability to keep information out of the government's 
hands," has been subject to a rich diversity of restatements, and 
a careful analysis of the jurisprudence of Articles Four and Five 
belies robust claims about their purported constancy over time.37 
36. Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been 
Amended? (A) <.26; (B) 26; (c) 27; (D)>27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in Lev-
inson, cd., Responding to Imperfection 14-24 (cited in note 33). Levinson offers an excel-
lent starting point for developing a conceptual account of how we might delineate consti-
tutional interpretation from constitutional alteration: the former is "linked in specifiable 
ways to analyses of the text or at least to the body of materials conventionally regarded 
as within the ambit of the committed constitutionalist," whereas the latter "signifies 
something out the ordinary, something truly new." Id. at 15. The distinction between in-
terpretation and alteration introduced here also overlaps somewhat with Joseph Raz's 
delineation of "conserving" from "innovatory" constitutional interpretation (On the Au-
thority and Interpretation of Constitutions, in Alexander, Constitutionalism at 182 (cited 
in note 5)). 
37. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L. J. 
393, 395 (1995). As Stuntz notes, "the substantive issues that shaped Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment law arc long since settled .... We have taken a privacy ideal formed in her-
esy cases and railroad regulation disputes, an ideal that had no connection to ordinary 
criminal law enforcement, and used it as the foundation for much of the vast body of law 
that polices the police. Predictably, the combination has not worked out very well." ld. at 
396 
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Some constitutional courts undertake what Robert Lipkin 
bluntly but aptly describes as "revolutionary adjudication," in 
which judges engage in fundamental reinterpretations of the ba-
sic constitutional "rules of the game" so as to alter core elements 
of the political system's legal and political identity.38 Constitu-
tional courts take on the authority of the constituent power by 
initiating ambitious forms of fundamental constitutional altera-
tion. Traditional (oftentimes politically conservative) legal 
commentators typically attribute the exercise of the constituent 
power by courts to power-hungry judges, or the endorsement of 
problematic models of flexible legal interpretation.39 From the 
vantage point of the diagnosis developed here, however, matters 
look more complicated. Whatever its normative and legal faults, 
the universal tendency for powerful courts to undertake frequent 
constitutional alteration represents a practical adaptation to a 
fundamental institutional dilemma: How can we achieve the fre-
quent constitutional change called for by the breakneck pace of 
social and economic acceleration? 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION IN AN AGE OF 
SPEED 
Activist constitutional courts represent only one possible in-
stitutional adaptation to social and economic acceleration. In 
this section, I offer a preliminary typology of constitutional 
change, oriented towards demonstrating that the experience of 
social and economic acceleration provides a starting point for 
making sense of some of its most widely-discussed dilemmas.40 
Social and economic acceleration also helps us conceptualize 
38. Robert Justin Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, 68 Ncb. L. 
Rev. 701,701-806 (1989). It has become relatively commonplace to point out that consti-
tutional courts often operate as the constituent or constitution-making power. For an ex-
cellent discussion of this trend and its implications for institutional reform, see Andrew 
Arata, The New Democracies and American Constitutional Design, 7 Constellations 333 
(2000). 
39. In this vein, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the 
Law 47 (Princeton U. Press, 1997). 
40. Cass Sunstein points out that statutory obsolescence rests on various sources, 
including the possibility that "a statutory provision may no longer be consistent with 
widely held social norms," and "the legal background [to a particular statute] may have 
changed dramatically as a result of legislative and judicial innovations." Sunstein, After 
the Rights Revolution at 174 (cited in note 28). Similarly, constitutional obsolescence un-
doubtedly has diverse roots. Nonetheless, the phenomenon of social and economic accel-
eration makes up an important source of the problem, and thus my emphasis on it here. 
What Sunstein describes as changing "factual assumptions" underlying an original legal 
norm (for example, the introduction of new technology) is contained in the notion of so-
cial and economic acceleration as used here. 
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enigmas whose existence hitherto has only been vaguely appre-
ciated. Most important, it underscores the existence of a paradox 
at the very heart of contemporary constitutionalism. Social and 
economic speed risks favoring insufficiently democratic mecha-
nisms for constitutional adaptation. Relatively democratic 
modes of constitutional change appear to mesh poorly with the 
imperatives of social and economic acceleration, thereby poten-
tially robbing constitutionalism of the democratic legitimacy 
which its most persuasive defenders rightly consider indispensa-
ble. The most well-trodden paths of constitutional change have 
entailed institutional adaptation primarily via (A) the "dualistic" 
system of formal amendment initiated by the U.S. founders, (B) 
courts, (C) legislatures (most famously, the U.K. system of con-
stitutional reform via parliamentary statute), and (D) the execu-
tive.41 
(A) Bruce Ackerman has recently reminded us of what ar-
guably was the greatest invention of the U.S. framers, namely a 
system of constitutional dualism in which the activities of "ordi-
nary" lawmaking are separated from "higher" constitutional leg-
islation. In this view, the U.S. founders rightly abandoned 
Locke's notion of a basically unalterable constitution, but they 
simultaneously insisted that fundamental constitutional reform 
would be required to take an arduous and time-consuming 
path.42 In the U.S. system, higher legislation involves making 
41. One might also add a further option to this list, namely the possibility that 
popular revolution is the only appropriate response to the inevitable decay of all consti-
tutions. During the U.S. Revolution, some radical republicans endorsed this approach. 
Michael Liencsch, New Order of the Ages: Time, the Constitution, and the Making of 
Modern American Political Thought 67 (Princeton U. Press, 1988). I neglect it here for 
the reason that social and economic acceleration suggests that revolutions of this type 
would have to be a more-or-less permanent affair, given the intense pace of social change 
and the necessity of frequent constitutional adaptation and revision. Surely, no defender 
of liberal-democratic constitutionalism wants permanent revolution. Two additional ca-
veats should be kept in mind. First, constitutional change always involves a variety of 
institutional and political actors, and any conceptual typology risks obscuring the messy 
empirical realities of constitutional change. The typology offered here (inspired by Al-
bert L. Sturm, Thirty Years of State Constitution-Making 18 (National Municipal League, 
1970)) aims at underscoring the fundamental institutional and normative challenges 
posed by the necessity of a relatively dynamic mode of constitutional adaptation. Second, 
the social theory debate suggests that social and economic acceleration represents a long-
term (that is, since the industrial revolution) process, but also that the speed-up of social 
and economic life continues to intensify. Although I cannot adequately demonstrate this 
empirical claim here, this leads me to believe that the dilemmas posed by social and eco-
nomic acceleration for constitutionalism have increased in the last century and are likely 
to continue to so in the future. 
42. For the historical and philosophical background, see Kyvig, Explicit and Au-
thentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995 at 19-109 (cited in note 3); Vile, 
The Constitutional Amending Process in American Political Thought at 23-78 (cited in 
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"supreme law in the name of the People," and it does so by as-
suring a greater level of democratic legitimacy than typically 
found in the ordinary course of political decision making. Consti-
tutional reform should not take place at the level of everyday 
politics, because the heightened democratic legitimacy required 
for constitutional lawmaking simply cannot be demonstrated by 
an electoral victory, for example, or the domination of one 
branch of the government by a single political party or candi-
date. In order for constitutional change to be legitimate, it "must 
take to the specially onerous obstacle course provided by a dual-
ist Constitution for purposes of higher lawmaking,"43 since the 
U.S. founders believed that fundamental change to the constitu-
tional system should exhibit a high degree of popular consensus. 
For this reason, they placed enormous burdens on the process of 
formal constitutional amendment: Future generations would be 
permitted to alter the original constitutional compact, but they 
note 2). The procedural core of Article V reads as follows: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for pro-
posing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Pur-
poses, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three 
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the 
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress. 
U.S. Const., Art. V. 
Notwithstanding its seeming clarity, Article V continues to inspired heated dis-
agreements. See Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment 
as well as Walter F. Murphy, Merlin's Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the 
Once and Future Polity, both in Levinson, cd., Responding to Imperfection at 89-115, 163-
90 (cited in note 33); Frank I. Michelman, Thirteen Easy Pieces, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1297, 
1297-1332 (1994). 
43. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 6 (Harvard U. Press, 1991). Ac-
kerman's views have generated a wide-ranging debate which, unfortunately, I cannot dis-
cuss here. See Andrew Arata, Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000); see also 104 Ethics No. 3 April, 1994 (a special issue devoted to Ac-
kerman's work). For now, let me just say that I find the outlines of Ackerman's model of 
constitutional dualism appealing, especially Arata's insight that there are "important rca-
sons why constitutional politics can and therefore should involve a wider and more de-
mocratic form of participation than normal politics." Arata, Civil Society, Constitution, 
and Legitimacy at 135-38. Nonetheless, there are many reasons for criticizing Acker-
man's own defense of the manner in which constitutional dualism in the U.S. has taken 
unexpected institutional paths. We need to separate Ackerman's core intuitions about 
constitutional dualism from the particular form it has taken in the U.S. The latter has 
been more problematic than Ackerman concedes. Like Arato, I am more skeptical than 
Ackerman of constitutional adaptation "outside of legality," and my discussion here pre-
supposes a normatively and institutionally more appreciative view of legal paths to con-
stitutional change. Arato, Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy at xiv. Of course, 
my sympathy for Ackerman's position raises fundamental normative questions about the 
relationship between democratic legitimacy and the idea of dualist constitutionalism. Un-
fortunately, I cannot address those questions here, though I should note that Arata's 
study docs a fine job investigating many of them. 
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would have to do so in accordance with the tough procedures 
outlined in Article V. 
Not only does constitutional dualism minimize the perils of 
leaving the authority to change the fundamental "rules of the 
game" to those immediately involved in the political game (for 
example, legislators), but it is simply mistaken to assert "that the 
winner of a fair and open election is entitled to rule with the full 
authority of We The People."44 No single institution (Congress, 
for example, or the executive) can legitimately claim to speak for 
"the people" as a whole, and we can only reasonably determine 
that a proposed change to the constitutional system possesses 
the requisite democratic legitimacy if it has successfully with-
stood a lengthy series of institutional tests. Of course, alternative 
liberal democratic models of constitutional change also presup-
pose that fundamental constitutional change should rest on a 
high degree of democratic legitimacy. But special about the U.S. 
innovation is the intuition that the achievement of a sufficient 
democratic basis for constitutional reform presupposes a rela-
tively lengthy period of intense political debate and mobiliza-
tion, as well as 1) express support from a broad range of political 
institutions, and 2) passage of a series of time-consuming institu-
tional tests in order to assure that popular support for constitu-
tional amendment is sufficiently deliberate and well-considered. 
Unfortunately, social and economic acceleration defies the 
temporal preconditions of this admirable vision of constitutional 
reform. A key "desideratum" of higher lawmaking is that "it 
proceed slowly and deliberately," and the toilsome procedures 
of Article V were clearly intended by the framers to decelerate 
popular debate and exchange in order to assure its reasonable 
character.45 They envisioned Article Vas requiring that constitu-
44. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations at 9 (cited in note 43). 
45. David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in Levinson, ed., Responding to 
Imperfection at 128 (cited in note 33); sec also DonaldS. Lutz, Toward a Constitutional 
Amendment in Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection at 239 (cited in note 33). The 
inflexibility of Article V in part derives from the fact that the founders may have been 
closer to Locke's notion of an "unalterable" constitution than many modern commenta-
tors acknowledge. Philip Hamburger has argued plausibly that the founders were deeply 
hostile to constitutional change, tending to envision Article V as a device for completing 
or perfecting what they conceived as a fundamentally timeless doctrine. By no means did 
they picture Article V as an instrument for adapting the constitution to social and eco-
nomic change. Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitutions's Accommodation of Social 
Change, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 239, 301 (1988). Morton Horwitz has also emphasized that the 
U.S. Constitution was long conceived as a fundamentally immutable document; only in 
the twentieth century was this view subjected to major criticism. Morton J. Horowitz, 
Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 
107 Harv. L. Rev. 30,30-117 (1993). 
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tiona! reform would be subject to a series of temporally drawn-
out institutional checks, in part because they believed that the 
reasonableness of popular debate and exchange could only be 
achieved by guaranteeing that it offered a fair hearing to a rich 
diversity of views, as well as a meaningful opportunity to ac-
knowledge the pluralism of interests found in modern society. 
Practiced in anything more than a small group, however, this 
meant that deliberation would have to be a slow-going affair.46 
Within the U.S. system, the process of ordinary legislation thus 
includes a number of mechanisms (bicameralism, for example, 
and the executive veto) aimed in part at decelerating decision 
making and thereby contributing to its deliberative merits.47 
From the perspective of the founders, it made no less sense to 
create amendment procedures significantly more complex and 
time-consuming than the rules of everyday legislative politics. 
How better to assure the correspondingly higher level of reason-
able democratic consensus called for by the vastly weightier 
tasks of higher lawmaking than by dramatically decelerating the 
process of constitutional change via cumbersome obstacles to 
formal amendment? 
The result of the founders' reflections was a system of 
amendment now widely seen as one of the most slow-going in 
the world.48 The framers were so effective at decelerating consti-
tutional reform via formal amendment that they arguably helped 
paralyze the U.S. system of formal amendment altogether; a vast 
range of scholarly studies describes the virtual impossibility of 
46. For example, note Madison's famous claim in Federalist 10 that in a large repub-
lic, "communication is always checked" (or slowed-down), which presumably should con-
tribute to the reasonable character of popular deliberation in the proposed American 
republic. Excessive speed in popular debate, it seems, is not conducive to well-considered 
outcomes. Federalist 10 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 83 
(Mentor, 1961 ). 
47. For David Hume, for example, bicameralism represented an instrument for 
preventing a "mere mob" from being easily influenced, and thus a way to help assure 
well-considered legislative decisions. David Hum.:, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, in 
Hume, Political Essays 153 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1953). More generally on the role of institu-
tional design in "cooling" (and decelerating) popular deliberation, sec Cass Sunstein, 
republic.com 38-39 (Princeton U. Press, 2001). 
48. Article V allows as few as thirteen of ninety-nine state legislative bodies to de-
feat the ratification of a proposed amendment, and "[t]he requirement for such extraor-
dinary majorities means that, in the case of structural amendments, any significant politi-
cal bloc possesses an effective veto." James L. Sundquist, Constitutional Reform and 
Effective Government 17 (The Brookings Institution, 1992). For an empirical demonstra-
tion of the enormous obstacles created by Article V, sec Lutz, Toward a Theory of Con-
stitutional Amendment, in Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection at 237 (cited in note 
33). 
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undertaking meaningful institutional reform via Article V.49 The 
diagnosis of contemporary society outlined above helps shed 
fresh light on this familiar quagmire. Social and economic accel-
eration implies that the amendment procedures of Article V in-
creasingly have operated in the context of a social and economic 
universe characterized by rapid-fire change and innovation. Our 
high-speed social and economic world conflicts with the time-
consuming procedures outlined in Article V, generating a misfit 
between the temporal horizons of formal constitutional amend-
ment and social and economic affairs. Of course, much of the ex-
isting critical literature on Article V laments its laggard charac-
ter. What that literature obscures is that "slowness" per se is no 
failing, particularly in a system of constitutional dualism where 
deliberateness is indispensable to higher lawmaking. Indeed, for 
the U.S. founders as for the mainstream of Enlightenment politi-
cal thought, slowness was generally a virtue to be aspired for in 
popular deliberation, whereas rapidity in mass politics typicallsb 
could be taken as prima facie evidence of its irrationality. 0 
Slowness only becomes a handicap in a social and economic 
world where speed is at a premium, and social change takes 
places at an ever more intense pace. 
Not surprising, the deliberate process of democratic consti-
tutional reform outlined by Article V has suffered from ne-
glect.51 Social and economic acceleration means that political ac-
tors repeatedly find themselves forced to adapt the 
constitutional system to incessant and oftentimes substantial so-
cial and economic change, and the procedures of Article V un-
derstandably appear to strike many of them as little more than a 
quaint leftover from a simpler world fundamentally irrelevant to 
the real-life institutional tasks of contemporary politics. Accord-
49. This is a theme of many of the essays collected in Levinson, ed., Responding to 
Imperfection (cited in note 33). The rigidity of Article V was anticipated by some of the 
Anti-Federalists, Federal Fanner, Leuer IV, in Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Complete 
Anti-Federalist: Writings by Opponents of the Constitution 59-60 (U. Chicago Press, 
1981 ). 
50. In this vein, recall again Madison's hope that a large republic would "check" (or 
decelerate) mass debate, thereby contributing to its reasonableness, as well as Locke's 
famous discussion of the "dissolution of government" in the Second Treatise, where he 
suggests that revolutionary politics is only well-considered after a tyrannized people has 
patiently tolerated a "long train of abuses." Patience and even procrastination are essen-
tial preconditions of reasonable popular deliberation John Locke, Second Treatise in Two 
Treatises of Government 'I 223 (Cambridge U. Press, 1988). 
51. Again, see the essays collected in Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection 
(cited in note 33). Revealingly, the most important amendments (XIII-XV) were ap· 
proved during the Reconstruction period, and were arguably forced upon the southern 
states by northern bayonets and rifles. 
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ingly, some of the most blunt assessments of the temporal misfit 
between Article V and contemporary society have come from 
perceptive politicians. During the heyday of the New Deal, pro-
posals to pursue a formal amendment in order to establish a 
sturdy constitutional basis for the emerging welfare state gener-
ated a terse response from President Roosevelt: referring to the 
lengthy time period it would surely take to alter the constitution, 
Roosevelt seems to have anticipated the temporal flaws of Arti-
cle V when he announced, "We can no longer afford the luxury 
of twenty-year lags. "52 Why waste scarce political energy on a 
fight for a formal amendment whose advantages might only ac-
crue decades down the road? 
To be sure, Article V outlines an unusually laborious set of 
amendment procedures, and the fundamental core of constitu-
tional dualism is undoubtedly consistent with somewhat less 
time-consuming methods of formal amendment. As we will see, 
Ackerman and others have proposed substantial modifications 
to Article V which nonetheless would preserve constitutional 
dualism. By the same token, it would be a mistake simply to 
chalk up the temporal misfit between formal constitutional 
amendment and contemporary society to the idiosyncrasies of 
the U.S. Constitution, or to suggest that alternative systems for 
formal amendment might easily overcome the dilemmas posed 
by social and economic acceleration. Social and economic accel-
eration implies that every system of formal amendment resting 
on dualistic constitutional principles, and thus committed to 
broad-based, time-consuming popular deliberation via lengthy 
institutional tests, is likely to find itself forced to deal with the 
temporal misfit described above. To the extent that contempo-
rary society also evinces a built-in intensification of social and 
economic acceleration, even those constitutional systems pos-
sessing amendment procedures significantly less cumbersome 
than Article V may be destined to struggle, to an increasing de-
gree, with problems akin to those which have long plagued con-
stitutional adaptation in the United States. 
Perhaps this is why there has not only been a significant re-
vival of scholarly interest in the question of constitutional 
change, but also why so many legal scholars today seem uncon-
vinced that any formal amendment could ever serve as an ade-
52. Kyvig, Explicit and Awhentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995 
at 306 (cited in note 3) (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses 4 
(Randon House, 1938). 
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quate device for achieving peaceful constitutional change. 53 At 
the very least, social and economic acceleration raises difficult 
questions for those of us sympathetic to the worthy liberal de-
mocratic ideal that constitutional adaptation via formal amend-
ment not only should take a deeply democratic form, but that we 
need to assure its deliberate and well-considered character by 
means of time-consuming institutional tests. 
(B) Courts also update the constitutional system in accor-
dance with changing social and economic realities. As noted 
above, social and economic acceleration implies the necessity of 
continuously reinterpreting constitutional norms, as well as fre-
quent alterations to key elements of the constitutional system. 
Not only does social and economic acceleration thereby help 
muddy any real-life border we might draw between "law" and 
"politics," but constitutional courts also will probably tend to 
modify the constitution and take on the role of stealth constitu-
ent power.54 The U.S. innovation of judicial review has provided 
institutional possibilities for constitutional change which un-
doubtedly would have surprised the founders: U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions often have impacted more profoundly on the 
fundamental operations of the political system than many of the 
formal amendments achieved via Article V.55 
In 1921, Justice Cardozo captured the underlying rationale 
for this path to constitutional change when he observed that in 
contemporary society "[n]othing is stable. Nothing absolute. All 
is fluid and changeable. We are back with Heraclitus."56 For 
Cardozo, the "perpetual flux" of social and economic relations 
defies formalistic modes of constitutional exegesis. Jurists would 
do well to offer a "more plastic, more malleable" reading of the 
53. Griffin notes that "constitutional scholars have become increasingly aware of 
the importance of developing a theory of constitutional change." Griffin, American Con-
stitutionalism at 10 (cited in note 34). A revealing illustration of the pervasive skepticism 
towards formal amendment found among contemporary (especially left-liberal) legal 
scholars is a lengthy article by Morton Horwitz on constitutional change in one of the 
nation's premier legal reviews, where formal amendment is ignored altogether. 
Horowitz, 107 Harv. L. Rev. at 30-117 (cited in note 45). Of course, this neglect contains 
a certain amount of plausibility if one endorses the radical notions of legal indeterminacy 
(occasionally) embraced by Horwitz. 
54. The distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional altera-
tion introduced above might be taken as one way by which we might delineate law (in-
terpretation) from politics (alteration). Of course, any attempt to salvage this distinction 
entails complex issues than I am unable to address in the confines of this essay. 
55. For a slew of plausible examples, see Lipkin, 68 Neb. L. Rev. at 734-39 (cited in 
note 38). 
56. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 28 (Yale U. Press, 
1921). 
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U.S. Constitution in order to guarantee its relevance to the 
changing exigencies of the times.57 Judges should minimize the 
impact of precedent in order to allow themselves room for crea-
tive readings of the law; the fidelity to the past intrinsic to stare 
decisis decreasingly makes sense given the profound fluidity and 
alterability of twentieth-century social and economic affairs. 
A few decades earlier, astute observers of the U.S. system 
had already attributed the growing tendency among American 
jurists to engage in creative constitutional interpretation to the 
weaknesses of Article V. In his influential essay on "Flexible and 
Rigid Constitutions," Bryce grouped the U.S. under the latter 
rubric, arguing that American judges often aspired to overcome 
the problem of constitutional rigidity, deriving in part from Arti-
cle V, by pursuing open-ended interpretations of constitutional 
law that their more formalistic British legal peers found shock-
ing. The case of the American Republic suggested that rigidity in 
formal amendment procedures might be compensated for by 
flexibility within constitutional exegesis. 58 
From the perspective of social and economic acceleration, 
constitutional adaptation via judicial interpretation exhibits a 
number of advantages vis-a-vis formal amendment. It allows for 
the recurrent reinterpretation of constitutional norms; since 
many of those reinterpretations do not possess the status of fun-
damental modifications or alterations to the constitution, this 
practice performs a vital function for a political system faced 
with "so continual and so intense" change. By not burdening 
constitutional adaptation with the time-consuming procedures 
called for by formal constitutional amendments, flexible comti-
tutional exegesis permits courts to respond more quickly to 
many difficult constitutional conflicts. To be sure, decision mak-
ing by higher courts is hardly a paragon of speed or efficiency, 
and their deliberate character is guaranteed by a slow-going 
57. Id. at 161. Jerome Frank similarly observed that "we have practically insisted on 
a flexible construction of its words to permit of the legalization of social changes which 
were never contemplated by our forefathers who drafted and adopted the sacred instru-
ment" of the U.S. Constitution. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 300 (Double-
day, 1930). There are reasons for suspecting that the U.S. founders would have been 
skeptical of the trend towards court-based constitutional adaptation via flexible exegesis. 
See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 363-64, 377-80 (Harvard U. Press, 1977). Unfortunately, "originalists" who 
make this point ignore the challenges of social and economic acceleration altogether. 
They may be right to worry about the tendency to "morph" the constitution for the sake 
of adjusting to social and economic change, but the dilemmas at hand will not vanish 
simply by kowtowing to the founders. 
58. See Bryce, Constitutions at 72-73 (cited in note 5). 
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process of legal niceties only moderately less arduous than for-
mal amendment. Nonetheless, in many situations the judiciary 
seems better suited than formal constitutional amendment to the 
temporal imperatives of our high-speed world. As Cardozo an-
ticipated in 1921, the widespread tendency among twentieth-
century jurists, especially in the U.S., to pursue supple constitu-
tional interpretation and downplay precedent has often provided 
jurists with the flexibility called for by a constantly changing so-
cial and economic environment. 
Echoing earlier critics of the anti-formalistic course of twen-
tieth-century American jurisprudence, the legal theorist Brian 
Bix correctly notes that the most influential present-day U.S. le-
gal philosopher, Ronald Dworkin, "emphasizes the possibility of 
revision too much and the likeliness of settledness too little ... 
[His theory] celebrates the notion of !he great individual judge 
rethinking whole areas of the law .... "'9 Whatever its faults from 
the standpoint of traditional liberal jurisprudence, Dworkin's 
theory meshes nicely with the structural dictates of a no less dy-
namic social and economic world. Indeed, the same can probably 
be claimed for many of the anti-formalistic trends influential in 
twentieth-century American legal thought. The universal phe-
nomenon of social and economic acceleration may be one of the 
reasons why both the U.S. innovation of judicial review and U.S. 
legal thought have proven so influential abroad in the last half 
century.60 Social and economic speed generates difficult institu-
tional challenges for every political system, and the U.S. example 
of powerful courts engaging in flexible interpretation offers 
proven devices for grappling with its consequences. 
However well-trodden, the court-driven path of constitu-
tional adaptation to social and economic acceleration suffers 
from serious flaws. Despite its temporal Achilles' heel, constitu-
tional lawmaking via formal amendment is conducive to rela-
tively impressive levels of legal constancy and clarity. Higher 
lawmaking by means of formal amendment not only implies that 
constitutional norms are unlikely to change rapidly, but major 
constitutional shifts will have to be achieved via express constitu-
tional lawmaking, where a relatively broad set of political con-
stituencies debates and gains familiarity with the issues at hand. 
In contrast, the tendency to minimize precedent and condone 
59. Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context 86 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2d ed. 
1999). 
60. Louis Henkin and Albert J. Rosenthal, eds., Constitutionalism and Rights: The 
Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad (Columbia U. Press, 1990). 
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flexible constitutional interpretation indicates likely reductions 
in legal constancy, and the practice of continuously adjusting 
constitutional norms to social and economic conditions risks di-
minishing the clarity of constitutional law as well. U.S. experi-
ence suggests that judges will tend to disguise even fundamental 
constitutional reform as conventional legal interpretation; a 
highly complex body of constitutional jurisprudence is the most 
likely consequence. The enhanced difficulty of predicting be-
forehand which constitutional norm may be applicable to a spe-
cific legal scenario poses tough questions for those of us who 
take the notion of a written constitution seriously.61 
Just as troublesome, constitutional change via judicial action 
suffers from democratic deficits. We hardly need endorse a sim-
plistic majoritarian conception of democratic politics in order to 
worry about the specter of constitutional courts regularly acting 
as the constituent power, or the potential dangers to popular ac-
countability when courts are so overwhelmed by social and eco-
nomic change that they are unable to distinguish between consti-
tutional interpretation and fundamental constitutional alteration 
in the first place. Nor does the narrow case-centered character of 
judicial decision making always leave courts "well suited to con-
front many of the constitutional problems of modern life. "62 
There are good normative and institutional reasons for judicial 
review. Whether present-day institutional versions of judicial re-
view are well-suited to the enormous tasks of constitutional ad-
aptation posed by our high-speed world, however, remains a le-
gitimate concern. Constitutional dualism resists the notion that 
any single institution should speak in the name of "the people." 
The fact that social and economic acceleration probably has 
helped transform constitutional courts into a "kind of Constitu-
tional Assembly in continuous session" should worry us.63 
(C) Elected legislatures often serve as the institutional focus 
for constitutional change, either by dominating the process of 
formal constitutional amendment, or by discarding the formal 
distinction between ordinary and constitutional legislation alto-
gether. Examples of the former include numerous political sys-
61. In this vein, see the excellent comments in Kay, 13 Ratio Juris at 44-47 (cited in 
note 4). 
62. Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations 406 (Harvard U. Press, 
1998). 
63. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 201 (Greenwood Press, 1963) (quoting Wood-
row Wilson). Arendt seems rather enamored of this ambivalent model of constitutional 
change. 
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terns where formal amendment procedures place special empha-
sis on a positive (oftentimes supermajority) vote of the central 
legislature, while Great Britain represents the classical example 
of the latter.64 From the perspective of constitutional dualism, 
parliament-motored constitutional adaptation represents an am-
bivalent normative response to social and economic acceleration. 
When they undertake fundamental alterations to the constitu-
tional system, legislatures risk succumbing to the illusion that 
they can effectively stand in for "the people" as a whole. By the 
same token, their broad-based representative character arguably 
makes elected legislatures better suited to many relatively mun-
dane aspects of constitutional adaptation than courts, and the 
fact that they need not focus on resolving individual legal dis-
putes often provides their activities with the general scope miss-
ing from judicial rulings. 
No less ambiguous are the temporal qualities of parliamen-
tary constitutional change. Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein 
have recently defended parliament-based constitutional adapta-
bility for the emerging democracies of eastern Europe, arguing 
that in the context of dramatic social and economic transforma-
tions, "a good deal of [constitutional] flexibility and 'ad hock-
ery"' represent the sine qua non of political survival.65 Given the 
turbulence of social and economic affairs in the new democra-
cies, "a general presumption in favor of flexible amending pro-
cedures dominated by the established powers, especially the leg-
islature," is necessary to assure a sufficient level of institutional 
adaptability.66 For our purposes here, Holmes's and Sunstein's 
view is revealing for two reasons. First, there is no need to 
downplay either the special facets or manifest severity of the 
enigmas faced by the eastern Europeans in order to acknowl-
edge that Holmes's and Sunstein's suggestive comments implic-
itly underscore a more general dilemma: As we have seen, social 
and economic acceleration indicates that constitutional systems 
everywhere require heightened adaptability. Second, there are 
64. In Ackerman's terminology, this model of constitutional change represents the 
paradigmatic case of "constitutional monism," for which "the British design captures the 
essence of democracy." Ackerman, We the People: Foundations at 8 (cited in note 43). 
65. Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in 
Eastern Europe, in Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection at 285 (cited in note 33). 
Holmes' and Sunstein's defense of legislatively-based constitutional reform is also en-
dorsed by Jeremy Waldron, ?recommitment and Disagreement, Constitutionalism, 292-
95. 
66. Holmes and Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe, 
in Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection at 295 (cited in note 65). 
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indeed good reasons for claiming that elected legislatures may 
respond more adeptly to social and economic acceleration than 
certain competing institutional mechanisms. However, we should 
not overstate the temporal virtues of the legislative mode of con-
stitutional change. Since Montesquieu, liberal political thought 
has typically envisioned legislative politics as predicated on a 
wide-ranging process of deliberative exchange involving a rela-
tively diverse and representative sample of public opinion, and 
liberal writers have repeatedly underscored the unhurried pre-
requisites of deliberate (and thereby legitimate) legislative deci-
sion making.67 Only if the legislature "takes its time" by engag-
ing in a relatively lengthy period of free-wheeling deliberation is 
it deserving of the privileged place attributed to it by traditional 
liberal democratic theory: In accordance with this basic intuition, 
Federalist 70 notes that the "differences of opinion" and "jarring 
of parties" found in elected legislatures mean that "promptitude 
of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit" there.68 
Real-life legislatures may very well succeed in rapidly ad-
justing the constitutional system to changing social and economic 
realities. However, the traditional view implies that they risk do-
ing so at the price of abandoning those slow-going deliberative 
attributes which justify their privileged status in the first place. 
The less-than-stellar record of legislative-based constitution-
makinJJ suggests that this anxiety deserves to be taken seri-
ously. In addition, parliamentary constitutional adaptation may 
ultimately prove less flexible than Holmes and Sunstein assume. 
They acknowledge that the parliamentarization of constitutional 
adaptation obscures the distinction between higher and ordinary 
law. Yet they miss the most obvious temporal dilemma gener-
ated by the tendency to reduce constitutional lawmaking to a 
subset of statutory legislation. As constitutional law comes to re-
semble an easily revised legal code, constitutions are likely to be 
filled with provisions no less detailed than those found in statu-
tory law. From one perspective, this trend seems advantageous, 
67. The liberal account of the legislature as a deliberative body was influenced by 
Montcsquieu, 11 The Spirit of the Laws !65 (Hafner Press, 1949). Within liberal democ-
ratic theory, deliberation has been conceptualized in many different ways, but the fun-
damental notion of a deliberative legislature has been well-nigh universal, at least until 
the advent of "realist" democratic theory in the twentieth century. 
68. Federalist 70 (Hamilton) in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 426-27 (cited in 
note 46). 
69. For example, see Andraas Saj6's comments on contemporary Hungary. An-
draas Saj6, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism 39-40 (Central 
European U. Press, 1999). 
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since it potentially indicates that constitutional law is undergoing 
an express and public revision of its fundamental norms in ac-
cordance with evolving social and economic realities. However, 
the easy amendability of constitutional law generates a troubling 
unintended consequence. Statutory law books are already filled 
with badly out-of-date rules and standards, in part because the 
half-life of ordinary legislation tends to decline in the face of so-
cial and economic acceleration. The legislative path to constitu-
tional adaptation risks exacerbating the general problem of legal 
obsolescence by allowing for rapid-fire amendments to a consti-
tutional document that increasingly will be pictured by lawmak-
ers as nothing more than an extension of ordinary legislation. 
The paradox is that the constitution's easily amendable character 
simultaneously increases the likelihood of a legal system unduly 
burdened by legal norms which soon appear far less relevant 
than they did at the time of their promulgation. Parliament-
based constitutional change inadvertently loads the constitu-
tional system with norms embodying quick legislative interven-
tions whose significance may very well prove short-lived. Hence, 
this mode of constitutional adaptation also seems destined to in-
crease the complexity of constitutional law, which hardly bodes 
well for the quest to preserve sufficient doses of legal constancy 
and clarity. 
A century ago, Bryce adamantly defended the parliamen-
tary model of constitutional change, favorably contrasting Great 
Britain's "flexible constitution" to the rigidity of the U.S. system. 
In some contrast to contemporary defenders of this approach, 
Bryce was forthright enough to suggest that easy legislative 
changes to the constitutional system would engender a compara-
bly complicated and even "mysterious" system of constitutional 
law.70 Social and economic acceleration increases the likelihood 
of that undesirable consequence. 
(D) Recent history includes sufficient examples of execu-
tive-driven constitutional reform, including France (1958), Yel-
tsin's Russia (1993) and Menem's Argentina (1994).71 The au-
thoritarian German jurist Carl Schmitt, who advised the Weimar 
government during the republic's final crisis-ridden hours, is 
probably the most impressive theorist of this path to constitu-
70. Bryce, Constitutions at 13, 22 (cited in note 5). 
71. Arendt had this path in mind when she observed that "Napolean Bonaparte was 
only the first in a long series of national statesmen who, to the applause of the whole na-
tion, could declare 'I am the pouvoir constituant. '"Arendt, On Revolution at 162 (c1ted m 
note 63). 
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tiona! change. Schmitt argued that in socially and politically di-
vided political systems, only a popularly-backed executive typi-
cally proves capable of initiating major constitutional reform. 
Amidst crisis scenarios in which the necessity of fundamental 
constitutional change becomes most pressing, amendment pro-
cedures are typically reduced to easily manipulated partisan po-
litical weapons, constitutional courts mask their fundamentally 
political preferences in the disingenuous language of the "rule of 
law," and pluralistic legislatures find themselves unable to de-
cide on anything meaningful whatsoever. Only a mass-based ex-
ecutive, ruling on the basis of a plebiscite consisting of "an unor-
ganized answer which the people, characterized as a mass, gives 
to a question which may be posed only by an authority whose ex-
istence is assumed," is likely to possess the institutional integrity 
required by the weighty tasks of constitutional reform.72 
Schmitt was so enamored of this path because he believed 
that it could help dismantle the liberal-democratic institutions 
which he so loathed. The fact that many who disagree funda-
mentally with his normative and political preferences nonethe-
less agree that executive-based constitutional reform contains 
authoritarian implications suggests that he may have been onto 
something. Constitutional dualism reminds us that no single po-
litical institution can legitimately speak in the name of "the peo-
ple" as a whole. The executive's attempt to claim the mantle of 
the constituent power is always especially dubious: Whereas a 
broadly based, multi-vocal legislature can sometimes plausibly 
represent a sizable portion of the diverse views and interests 
found in society, a single uni-vocal executive generally cannot do 
so.73 In addition, executive-driven constitutional reform is often 
accompanied by the specter of political violence, as other politi-
cal organs are forced to cede their formal authority over consti-
tution-making and accept purely advisory roles. Andrew Arato 
rightly wonders whether any elected legislature that allows the 
executive to monopolize constitution-making authority would 
reasonably do so as "anything other than implicit response to the 
72. Otto Kirchheimer, ConstitUlional Reaction in 1932, in Frederic S. Burin and 
Kurt L. Shell, eds., Politics, Law & Social Change: Selected £says of Otto Kirchheimer 78 
(Columbia U. Press, 1969). Schmitt's key arguments on executive-based constitutional 
change are found in his Der Hueter der Verfassung (Mohr, 1931 ); Legalitaet und Legitimi-
taet (Duncker & Humblot, 1932). 
73. This is one of the more familiar reasons for the privileged legislative status of 
elected representative bodies vis-a-vis the executive in traditional liberal democratic the-
ory. 
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threat of force." 74 The crisis-situations that serve as the most 
common terrain for executive-based constitutional change rarely 
prove conducive to broadly-based popular deliberation and re-
flection. On the contrary, the executive justifies clamping down 
on civil liberties and minimizing parliamentary participation be-
cause the dictates of the emergency situation allegedly conflict 
with the luxury of time-consuming deliberation. 
The crisis rhetoric often exploited by would-be executive 
constitutional reformers is revealing. Since Machiavelli, execu-
tive power has been intimately associated with the possibility of 
rapid-fire agere in juxtaposition to slow-going deliberare.75 In this 
spirit, Federalist 70 notes that only by placing executive authority 
in the hands of "one man" can unity "conducive to energy," as 
well as "decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch," be assured.76 
Montesquieu's observation that a plural executive conflicts with 
the main purpose of executive power, namely its capacity to act 
with "dispatch," was already well on its way to becoming dogma 
by the time Hamilton outlined the basic structure of the U.S. 
President.77 The association of the executive with "dispatch" (or 
speed) remains a crucial feature of contemporary liberal democ-
ratic thinking as well. For example, in a pivotal 1936 Supreme 
Court decision that dramatically enhanced executive authority in 
foreign policy, Justice Sutherland described the President as the 
only institutional actor who "can energize and direct policy in 
ways that could not be done by either Congress or his own bu-
reaucracy. His decision-making processes can take on degrees of 
speed, secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no other govern-
mental institution can match. "78 Executives who aspire to under-
74. Arata, Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy at 234 (cited in note 43). 
75. See William E. Scheuerman, Emergency Powers and the Compression of Space 
and Time in Yoram Dinstein, ed., Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (Kluwer Law lnt'l, 
2002). 
76. Federalist 70 (Hamilton) in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at 424 (cited in 
note 46). 
77. Montesquieu, 11 The Spirit of the Laws at 156 (cited in note 67). 
78. Harold H. Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the 
Iran-Contra Affair, 119 (Yale U. Press, 1990). United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co. 
helped redefine the constitutional structure of U.S. foreign policy making. 299 U.S. 304 
(1936). Of course, this example reminds us that executive-based constitutional change is 
oftentimes assisted by other institutions (for example, the courts). In this way, my typol-
ogy of constitutional change tends to minimize the empirical complexity of most cases of 
constitutional change. The same notion of an "energetic" rapid-fire executive paved the 
way for vast executive discretion in international economic policy. As Ackerman and 
David Golove note, New Dealers helped provide the U.S. President with heightened au-
thority over foreign trade by arguing that the "country's chief rivals were constitutionally 
equipped for rapid action. Their chief executives could act promptly ... It followed that 
Congress must empower the executive branch to move decisively to make the most of the 
2002] CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF SPEED 385 
take major constitutional reform obviously have much to gain by 
using, manufacturing, or even simulating crises, since emergen-
cies cry out for rapid-fire responses and the executive is purport-
edly best suited to initiate such responses. 
Fundamental constitutional alteration obviously represents 
a key aspect of constitutional change. However, constitutional 
norms are also adapted to social and economic acceleration in 
less dramatic ways. Social and economic acceleration risks trans-
forming the executive into a privileged site for constitutional ad-
aptation, fundamental or otherwise. Earlier in the essay I noted 
that the intensification of social and economic change not only 
requires a more-or-less permanent reinterpretation of constitu-
tional norms, but frequent alterations to the fundamental rules 
of the constitutional system as well. I also suggested that social 
and economic acceleration makes it increasingly difficult to draw 
a clear line between constitutional interpretation and fundamen-
tal alteration. These points are important for understanding ex-
ecutive-driven constitutional change as well. If I am not mis-
taken, there are pressing reasons for expecting the executive to 
gain most from the process of social and economic acceleration. 
Our traditional preconceptions about executive power imply 
that executive-based constitutional adaptation is best suited to 
social and economic acceleration. If 1) the executive is institu-
tionally best-equipped to undertake rapid-fire action, and 2) 
ours is a social world in which the need for rapid-fire responses 
to changing social and economic realities is at a premium, then 
3) the executive would seem especially well-adapted to many 
facets of constitutional adaptation. To the extent that social and 
economic acceler& ~ion implies both incessant reinterpretations 
and frequent alterations to the constitutional system, substantial 
doses of executive-driven constitutional change might seem to 
represent a perfectly sensible institutional adaptation, notwith-
standing its potential normative and political ills. Just as the dis-
tinction between interpretation and fundamental alteration so 
often becomes unclear in legal practice, so too the difficulty of 
distinguishing between the executive's reinterpretation of the 
constitutional "rules of the game" and its fundamental modifica-
tion or alteration of those rules is likely to grow. 
Only systematic empirical res~arch can demonstrate 
whether social and economic acceleration actually contributes to 
nation's economic opportunities" Is NAFTA Constitutional? 48 (Harv. U. Press, 1995). 
This type of argument has been more commonplace than I can demonstrate here. 
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the amplification of executive authority long observed by politi-
cal scientists and legal scholars. Nonetheless, there are good rea-
sons for suspecting that the speed-up of social and economic re-
lations represents a neglected part of the familiar story of the 
growth of executive authority along with the corresponding de-
cay of traditional legal virtues-including constancy and clar-
ity-entailed by executive discretion.79 Especially in foreign pol-
icy, the necessity for "dispatch" functions as a ready justification 
for undertaking substantial executive-driven alterations to the 
constitutional status quo.80 Economic and social crises, and even 
the relatively ordinary tasks of economic management, also risk 
increasing the scope of executive prerogative, since the executive 
seems best equipped to provide the rapid-fire institutional re-
sponses reRuired by the high-speed dynamics of contemporary 
capitalism.8 In light of the "rapidity, scope, and intensity" of so-
cial and economic change, the traditional association of the ex-
ecutive with speed potentially paves the way for unparalleled 
exercises of executive power. 
IV. REVITALIZING CONSTITUTIONALISM? 
How then might we combat the tendency of social and eco-
nomic acceleration to dismantle constancy and clarity in consti-
tutional law, as well as privilege insufficiently democratic modes 
of constitutional adaptation? A number of proposals on the ta-
ble suggest that we need not throw our hands in the air in des-
peration. Ackerman favors streamlining the U.S. system of 
amendment by minimizing the authority given the state govern-
ments by Article V. In his proposal, a successfully re-elected 
President would be authorized to initiate amendments, which 
would then be subject to congressional ratification as well as 
popular approval by means of referenda taking place in the fol-
79. Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of 
Public Authority (W.W. Norton & Co., 1969). 
80. On the growth of executive power in U.S. foreign policy, see the excellent siudy 
by Gordon Silverstein, Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional Interpretation and the Mak-
ing of American Foreign Policy (Oxford U. Press, 1997). On Its challenges to traditiOnal 
liberal conceptions of the law, see Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Lib-
eralism, 98 Yale L.J. 1385, 1400-21 (1989). 
81. Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmiu's Theory 
of Emergency Powers and the 'Norm-Exception' Dichotomy, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1825, 
1825-68 (2000); D.J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official D1scretwn 
(Clarendon Press, 1986); William E. Scheuerman, The Economic State of Emergency, 21 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1869, 1869-95 (2000). 
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lowing two presidential election years. 82 While liberating the 
U.S. system of a key source of its extreme laggardness, namely 
the necessity for ratification by a supermajority of state legisla-
tures or constitutional conventions, Ackerman's proposal none-
theless strives to preserve the basic contours of constitutional 
dualism. In an analogous spirit, Arato points out that the new 
democracies in eastern Europe have institutionalized formal 
amendment rules whose temporal requirements position them 
between the "extremely rigid American or the totally flexible 
British constitution" in order to assure a healthy balance be-
tween legal constancy and adaptability. 83 Recent constitutional 
framers have perceptively tried to avoid the excessively static 
character of the U.S. system of formal amendment as well as the 
potential ills of undue constitutional fluidity. Arguing that the 
U.S. finally needs to borrow from recent constitutional innova-
tions abroad, Arato advocates "a new, more differentiated 
amendment rule" which would allow for easier changes to politi-
cal institutions, while insulating certain features of the constitu-
tional system (most important, the Bill of Rights and judicial in-
dependence). A differentiated amendment mechanism pur-
portedly would allow for greater institutional adaptability while 
also protecting elements of the constitution where excessive 
flexibility is disadvantageous. By exposing the Supreme Court to 
heightened possibilities of override, an additional virtue of this 
proposal would be its potential prowess as a check on the 
Court's problematic tendency to act as constituent power.84 
Whatever their particular merits, proposals of this type illus-
trate how we might begin to outfit constitutionalism more effec-
tively for the exigencies of social and economic acceleration.85 A 
central implication of the argument offered above is that any se-
rious discussion of constitutionalism needs to provide adequate 
room for the phenomenon of social and economic acceleration. 
Worthy normative and institutional ideas about constitutional-
ism remain of limited value unless we can demonstrate their 
suitability to our high-speed world. 
82. Ackerman, We the People: Transformations at 410-14 (cited in note 62). 
83. Arato. The New Democracies and American Constitutional Design at 324 (cited 
in note 38). 
84. Id. at 334-35. 
85. Obvious concerns are that Ackerman's proposal unduly downplays the federal 
structure of Article V; the key role of the executive in initiating amendments also raises 
the specter of excessive plebiscitarianism. In a recent article, Ackerman seems to ac-
knowledge the latter danger. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. 
L. Rev. 634,634-729 (2000). 
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If such institutional reflections are to bear fruit, however, 
they will also have to reexamine a traditional pair of assumptions 
that played a crucial role in much of the argument developed 
above. At various junctures I referred to the presupposition, 
widely shared among modern liberal democratic theorists, that 
deliberation involving anything more than a small number of in-
dividuals is necessarily time-consuming: When a relatively sub-
stantial group of participants engages in cognitively sophisticated 
deliberation where a broad array of views is formulated and ac-
knowledged, and a no less rich array of interests expressed, de-
liberation will have to be measured and unhurried. In order to 
take a reasonable and thereby legitimate form, deliberation 
takes time, and this holds for both political life at large (for ex-
ample, in civil society) and for those formal institutions (most 
important, the legislature) intended to be representative and 
broad based in character. As we saw above, this assumption is 
indispensable for understanding the U.S. model of constitutional 
dualism, as well as the conception of formal amendment deriving 
from it; the framers of the U.S. Constitution burdened subse-
quent generations with the demanding procedures of Article V 
in part because they wanted to encourage a high level of circum-
spection in higher constitutional lawmaking. This assumption is 
also crucial for understanding the failure of the existing U.S. in-
stantiation of constitutional dualism to deal adequately with so-
cial and economic acceleration; formal amendment has been ne-
glected in part because of its temporal misfit with high-speed 
social and economic activity. As I also tried to argue in the pre-
vious section of this essay, some important institutional attempts 
at constitutional adaptation can be understood as compensatory 
adjustments to that temporal misfit. 
We also saw that the orthodox picture of the "energetic" 
executive as capable of rapid-fire action continues to play a sig-
nificant role in liberal democratic thinking. I suggested that this 
presupposition potentially opens the door to an executive-
dominated system of constitutional adaptation, and that legal 
and political appeals to the executive's high-speed character 
have helped justify its increasingly impressive powers. Although 
empirical verification is still called for, this assumption likely 
constitutes one source of the enormous expansion of executive 
authority in the twentieth century. The dictates of speed cry out 
for flexible, rapid-fire institutional responses, and the classical 
temporal portrait of the executive easily leads political and legal 
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actors to deem the executive best attuned to tackling the impera-
tives of constitutional adaptation in an age of speed. 
But what if the traditional contrast between slow-going de-
liberare and high-speed agere no longer makes sense? What if we 
need presuppose neither a misfit between popular deliberation 
and social and economic acceleration, nor the superior suitability 
of the executive to the imperatives of speed? In fact, the modern 
executive is a complex institutional entity, made up of a host of 
(oftentimes competing) administrative units, and the emphasis in 
traditional reflections on the unitary and even solitary nature of 
executive power obscures the empirical realities of executive de-
cision making. Even when the executive branch acts unilaterally, 
relatively simple undertakings can still prove arduous and time-
consuming, as anyone familiar with the less-than-efficient opera-
tions of most executive-based dictatorships can attest. 86 Uncriti-
cal reliance on Hamilton's concretistic description of the execu-
tive as "one man" meshes poorly with the decision-making 
realities of modern executive power and the modern administra-
tive state. Similarly, traditional temporal accounts of popular de-
liberation require reexamination as well. For example, early 
modern discussions of popular deliberation arguably presuppose 
underdeveloped forms of transportation and communication; 
well into the nineteenth century, elected representatives were 
forced to engage in time-consuming travel in order to meet their 
colleagues, and correspondence or news might require weeks or 
even months to reach its target. In an age of instantaneous com-
munication and high-speed travel, the temporal presuppositions 
of popular deliberation are dramatically different than in the 
days of Alexander Hamilton or even John Dewey, as new tech-
nologies allow huge numbers of people to exchange views at un-
paralleled speed. The association of popular deliberation with 
"slowness" no longer deserves the self-evident character that it 
possessed for so many of our historical predecessors. 
These concluding observations raise numerous unanswered 
questions, not the least of which concerns the difficulty of 
achieving reasoned and well-considered deliberation in an era of 
high-speed communications technology.87 But they also point to 
86. For an account highlighting the sluggishness and inefficiency of an executive-
based state, sec Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National 
Socialism, 1933-44 (Oxford U. Press, 1942). 
87. For example, see the lively exchange on the question Is the Internet bad for de-
mocracy? including contributions by Cass Sunstein, Shanto Iyengar, Ronald Jacobs, 
Henry Jenkins, Robert McChesney, Jay Rosen, and Michael Schudson (26 Boston Rev. 
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the prospect that social and economic acceleration contains posi-
tive implications for liberal democracy neglected in the story re-
counted above. Although social and economic acceleration risks 
disabling democratic modes of constitutional adaptation and 
contributing to the decay of constancy and clarity in constitu-
tional law, it may also open up new possibilities for renewing lib-
eral democratic constitutionalism. If liberal democracy is to be-
come a progressive and forward-looking "vital force" as Dewey 
hoped in 1935, we will need to think hard about how the age of 
speed not only threatens constitutionalism, but potentially points 
the way to its revitalization as well. 
4-24 (Summer 2001)). See also generally Darin Barney, Prometheus Wired: The Hope for 
Democracy in the Age of Network Technology (U. Chicago Press, 2000). 
